Thu. Apr 11th, 2024

The Collapse of Alameda and FTX

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Nansen’s analysis crew dives into the collapse of Alameda and FTX utilizing blockchain analytics
It began with CoinDesk reporting that “There are further FTX tokens amongst its $8 billion of liabilities: $292 million of “locked FTT.” (The liabilities are dominated by $7.4 billion of loans.).

Subsequent, Alameda Evaluation’s CEO, Caroline Ellison, supplied to purchase up Binance’s FTX Tokens (FTT) at $22 per token. What adopted was undoubtedly one among crypto’s craziest occasions – the collapse of FTX and Alameda. 
So how did this occur? Did the de-pegging of TerraUSD, Luna’s failure, and the chapter of 3AC all result in FTX and Alameda’s fall from grace?

 Or was it mismanagement of hazard and misuse of customers’ funds all alongside? 
Nansen has compiled an in-depth evaluation utilizing on-chain knowledge to piece collectively the fallen dominos of FTX and Alameda. The place doable, we aspire to present an purpose account backed by on-chain proof.

Our research doesn’t cowl potential off-chain occasions. This analysis leverages Nansen’s labeling heuristics to trace acknowledged wallets of the concerned entities and guarantee their actions on-chain, to make sense of what really occurred within the midst of the FTX-Alameda debacle. 

To put it merely, our on-chain evaluation makes use of data from a blockchain ledger to go looking out out the sequence of occasions and fund balances associated to the autumn of FTX and Alameda. Evaluation Analysts check out the transaction knowledge and crypto pockets actions of the concerned entities, two foremost knowledge sources helpful when attempting to piece collectively what had occurred.

Using a confirmed methodology that we had beforehand used for varied on-chain analyses (TerraUSD de-peg, stETH de-peg), we framed our research utilizing a grounded principle methodology the place an inventory of pockets balances and transaction volumes processed by these wallets are on the core of this research.

Via a evaluation of gray literature much like social media dialogue board threads, media security, and podcasts, we narrowed the scope of our research to supply consideration to transactional knowledge all through the next timeframes:

We furthermore paid shut consideration to a set of pockets addresses which we now have acknowledged as every FTX’s or Alameda’s, you will see the report of addresses and labels all through the Appendix Half. 

The report is formatted in three distinct sections. Half 1 acts as a prologue, offering the context to navigate the connection between FTX, Alameda, and their interactions with the FTX Token (FTT). Half 2 particulars the interplay and entanglement between FTX and Alameda by among the many many essential occasions all through the most recent market cycle. Lastly, Half 3 zooms in on the on-chain knowledge, primarily between 2 November and 9 November.

We attempt to triangulate in sort (on-line) narratives with the variable on-chain footprints to make sense of FTX’s and Alameda’s positions and holdings all by means of this era. It is not any secret that Alameda and FTX have been each based by SBF, and had ongoing partnerships. Nonetheless, it’s rumored that FTX was solely actually began to boost funds for Alameda and the 2 colluded from the very starting.

We leveraged on-chain proof to attract doable interpretations.
It is not any secret that Alameda was one among, if not the earliest, liquidity suppliers on FTX. Nonetheless, this poses a query of how concerned the 2 entities have been. 

What was seen:
Alameda’s pockets interacted with FTX ahead of it had even launched in Would probably 2019; apart from completely completely different CEX addresses, it was the one clearly identifiable counterparty. 

What it might recommend:
Although comparatively low in quantity (~$160k), this strongly implies that every Alameda was fastidiously concerned in FTX’s inception or there was no clear separation between Alameda and FTX then – and probably, even each.

FTT is a utility token for the FTX platform, it doesn’t entitle prospects to a component of the platform earnings or characterize a share in FTX. It is not backed nor does it give administration over governance picks or FTX’s treasury.

What we seen:
Two days ahead of the official itemizing on FTX on 29 July 2019, Alameda acquired 5m FTT in three transactions instantly from the FTX Deployer (who minted the FTT) to their FTX account.

Furthermore, 20m FTT have been deposited by the FTX Deployer to an FTX-related FTX deposit pockets on the day of the itemizing. These have been the entire thing of FTT in circulation on the time.Roughly per week after the itemizing, 5m FTT was despatched as soon as extra to the FTX Deployer on 5 August 2019.

What it might recommend:
The 5m FTT returned to the FTX Deployer normally are typically the equal ones deposited into the Alameda FTX account. 
An optimistic interpretation might very effectively be that Alameda was concerned all through the market-making of FTT tokens. This principle, nevertheless, doesn’t clarify why the funds have been despatched as soon as extra solely after just a few days.

A pessimistic interpretation might very effectively be that Alameda profited off the ICO contributors by promoting the tokens ahead of completely completely different patrons’ tokens have been unlocked and buying for them as soon as extra cheaper afterward  to return to FTX.
What we seen:

Using the official token distribution from the FTX docs and evaluating it to on-chain actions ranging from the primary token actions after minting in late July 2019 till December 2020, a attainable state of affairs may be devised for the early distribution of FTT:
Observing the above parameters, we well-known some key observations: 

What it might recommend:
Our observations raised additional questions: Why was there a necessity for FTX to have such a concentrated current of tokens? Why would they select a pockets (Alameda’s) consequently of the beneficiary for the FTT company tokens, that’s not instantly managed by FTX themselves? 

There was, nevertheless, a limitation in using on-chain knowledge to flooring choices to those questions. Subsequently, we centered on what may be answered by on-chain knowledge instead.

Early transaction practice of FTT steered that: 
Fast ahead to the bull market of 2021, the FTT token seen a meteoric rise, roughly 800x from the seed price of $0.10 to $84 at ATH in summer time season season 2021.

The rise all through the price of FTT seen the fully diluted valuation of FTT reached virtually $30b on the all-time highs – most of which have been owned by Alameda and FTX. 

Regardless that the tokens are technically liquid, these components would have been inconceivable to liquidate for Alameda all through the open market. Alameda promoting may set off in depth downward swings in price, and in flip devalue their very private remaining positions together with these of the opposite holders, with FTX being by far the most important.

This was a gordian knot for Alameda’s FTT holdings and created an extra co-dependency between Alameda and FTX.
With Alameda not with the ability to promote its FTT holdings in large components, and FTT not producing ample liquid earnings, the potential choices for them to amass liquidity utilizing FTT have been:

Discover that quite a few the methods to entry liquidity utilizing FTT have been already utilized by FTX from the beginning, with FTX prospects consequently of the counterparty. Whereas OTC promoting and liquidity provision are comparatively lots a lot much less dangerous, borrowing within the route of FTT is taken into consideration dangerous as a liquidation occasion would have an infinite damaging have an effect on on each FTX and Alameda.

What we seen:
There have been large FTT transactions between FTX, Alameda, and Genesis Shopping for and selling:
In September 2021, there have been widespread inflows and outflows from FTX and Alameda into Genesis Shopping for and selling. First, we seen a rise in sizable deposits from FTX to Genesis, adopted by a major swap of FTT tokens from Genesis to Alameda’s FTX deal with. 

It may in all probability be doable that FTX despatched FTT to Genesis with the intention for the FTT for use as collateral for a mortgage to Alameda. Nonetheless, if this assumption was true then why did Genesis ship Alameda the 20m FTT ($1.6b) instead of varied, further liquid tokens? Such an prevalence contradicts the logic that FTT was meant as collateral on account of its low liquidity.

Then, in December 2021, Alameda despatched an infinite FTT deposit to Genesis Shopping for and selling pockets, totaling roughly 38m FTT or $1.7b on the time:

What this may occasionally recommend:
Alameda may need every tried to promote some FTT OTC to Genesis, or tried to make the most of the transferred FTT as collateral for a mortgage from Genesis. Nonetheless, as Genesis is a centralized platform, we’re unable to go looking out out this primarily utilizing our on-chain knowledge sources. 

Furthermore, particular outflows from centralized platforms much like Genesis are exhausting to hint on-chain, as a result of this truth, it’s robust to pinpoint precisely how quite lots Alameda had doubtlessly borrowed. 

Alameda was furthermore seen to be utilizing FTT as collateral to borrow funds on DeFi platforms much like Abracadabra Money (MIM), although perhaps on a quite lots smaller scale in contrast with their interactions with CeFi lenders much like Genesis. 

The on-chain knowledge for FTT thus far hints on the following strategy:
Nonetheless, by means of the use of this methodology – taking out loans with FTT as collateral and utilizing the mortgage to make additional investments – would have put them effectively in a leveraged extended place.

FTT would have been a central weak spot for Alameda and FTX, with price drops posing a extraordinarily exact menace. The moderately skinny liquidity in contrast with whole current would have made large market product gross sales very harmful (e.g. by liquidation of Alameda’s borrowing positions, the chapter of corporations that personal an entire lot of FTT, or “dumping” by completely completely different large holders like Binance). 

Whereas this methodology may need labored accurately all through the bull market of 2021, it might want turned bitter when markets began to go within the route of their favor, notably within the midst of the Would probably/June 2022 crash: 

Offered that essential components of Alameda’s stability sheet had consisted of illiquid belongings,  Alameda may need confronted important liquidity challenges within the midst of the Would probably/June 2022 interval. 

With the UST de-peg and the best way through which the state of affairs had unfolded, many entities have been adversely impacted then. For full security of how the UST de-peg unfolded and the entities concerned, our crew had coated the state of affairs in-depth right here.

The subsequent contagion took down 3AC and Celsius in mid-June 2022 which we had coated on this report; each have been debtors to Genesis (who may doubtlessly have had publicity to Alameda based mostly on their on-chain interactions involving the FTT token). 

What we seen:
Breaking down the chain of occasions, this usually is a brief run-down of what we had seen on-chain: 
Between June 9-23, Alameda acquired an infinite influx of FTT from 5 fairly just a few entities: Fund:0xf155, Huobi, Genesis Buying and selling OTC, Excessive Stability, and Discovered on Avalanche

June 9
Extreme Stability acquired 2.7m FTT ($78m) from Celsius: Pockets, which was despatched to Alameda FTX deposit. 

June 10
Extreme Stability acquired one completely different 1.6m FTT ($45.6m) from Celsius: Pockets, which was furthermore despatched to Alameda’s FTX deposit. The spike of FTT influx to Extreme Stability pockets was evident on each June 9 and June 10 (as seen all through the screenshot beneath). 

June 13
Extreme Stability acquired one completely different 600k FTT ($14.6m) which was despatched to Alameda FTX deposit. 

June 14
Fund:0xf155 normally receives their FTT tokens from FTX and BlockFi which is shipped out to Alameda’s pockets, together with 27.5m ($631m) FTT from FTX which was then instantly despatched as soon as extra to FTX.
Genesis Shopping for and selling: OTC desk despatched 3.7m FTT ($89m) to Alameda FTX deposit.

 June 15
Huobi despatched an entire of 788k FTT ($18.9m) to Alameda FTX deposit. 

June 16
Fund: 0xf155 acquired 14m FTT ($326m) and it was despatched on to Alameda FTX deposit. 

June 17
Alameda FTX deposit acquired 6.2m FTT ($151m) from Genesis Shopping for and selling: OTC desk and 18m FTT ($450m) from Fund: 0xf155, which that that they’d acquired earlier that day.

June 18
Fund: 0xf155 despatched 27m FTT ($631m) to Alameda FTX deposit.

 June 20
Genesis Shopping for and selling: OTC desk despatched an entire of 13.6m FTT ($364m) to Alameda FTX deposit. 

June 21
Found on Avalanche despatched 2.3m FTT ($63m) to Alameda FTX deposit. 

June 22
Alameda FTX deposit acquired 408k FTT ($11m) from Extreme Stability and 249k FTT ($6m) from Found on Avalanche.

June 23
Genesis Shopping for and selling: OTC desk despatched 14.5m FTT ($381m) to  Alameda FTX deposit.

June 29
Huobi sends the most important quantity of FTT to Alameda FTX deposits on condition that Terra / UST disaster. An entire of 18.4m FTT ($47.2m) was transferred.

June 14 – July 1
Between June 14 and July 1, Genesis despatched an entire of 56.6m FTT ($1.4b) to Alameda’s FTX Deposit. The fairly just a few on-chain swap volumes may recommend that Genesis was doubtlessly a key lender to Alameda.

Definitely, if Alameda had liquidity elements, they may have been in a extraordinarily tight spot with restricted choices for orderly liquidating its belongings to satisfy capital necessities.

 With lenders normally being cautious after the 3AC disaster, borrowing instantly from FTX may need appeared identical to the one simple lifeline to keep away from chapter:

In response to the newest report by New York Cases on How Sam Bankman-Fried’s Crypto Empire collapsed, Alameda’s CEO confirmed that “over the most recent months, Alameda had taken out loans and used the cash to make VC investments, amongst completely completely different expenditures.”

Alameda CEO furthermore confirmed that “all through the time the crypto markets crashed this spring, lenders moved to recall these loans nonetheless the funds that Alameda spent was not merely accessible.” Consequently, Alameda resorted to FTX’s purchaser funds to make the funds.

 Did Alameda actually get maintain of an FTT-backed mortgage from FTX?
We checked out FTT deposits from Alameda onto FTX which might have been posted as collateral, together with non-FTT outflows from FTX to Alameda.

What we seen:
There have been massive web FTT inflows from Alameda to FTX all by means of mid-June, coinciding with the 3AC collapse, totaling 163m FTT, price spherical $4b on the time.

It is troublesome to appropriately attribute outflows from centralized platforms into entities on-chain, and some of these funds might have circled as soon as extra to Alameda instantly or by means of a 3rd get collectively and as soon as extra to FTX as quickly as additional. Subsequently, the net values displayed all through the chart may attainable be bigger than the precise web influx.

A check out FTX’s particular person fund pockets reveals, nevertheless, that the stability on FTX rose from 14m FTT to 54m FTT, a rise of 40m FTT, ~$1.2b from mid-June to mid-July, most of which might be attributed to Alameda.

What this may occasionally recommend:
Alameda deposited as quite lots as ~$4b (based mostly on mapped web inflows) price of FTT tokens on FTX between early June and July, with the height being within the midst of the 3AC collapse all through the week of 12 June 2022.That’s in keeping with the interview from Reuters with quite a bit of individuals near Bankman-Fried, revealing a $4b mortgage from FTX to Alameda backed by FTT tokens, Robinhood shares, and completely completely different belongings.

The query of whether or not or not or not FTX supplied funds to Alameda, can’t be conclusively answered by on-chain knowledge alone.
FTX may need despatched the funds to any recipient, together with the creditor instantly, in any token, on (virtually) any chain together with supplied the funds completely off-chain. 

Furthermore, taking a look at pockets stability modifications is inconclusive as accurately. 
As for the FTX pockets balances, many withdrew funds from the commerce all by means of these turbulent conditions, resulting in excessive fluctuations inside your complete stability. Furthermore, it’s unclear what the precise stability of funds should have been, so figuring out a attainable delta may also be not an choice.

What may in all probability be seen have been fairly just a few token flows between FTX and Alameda with values starting from tens of heaps of to tens of 1000’s and 1000’s in USD worth. Whereas we did observe just a few unusually large transactions with transaction values all through the an entire bunch of 1000’s and 1000’s in USD worth, we didn’t have sufficient proof to triangulate and deem these transactions to be “suspicious” or to fully as soon as extra the speculation.

Nonetheless, it stays a thriller as to what was the purpose of these following large transactions.
We summarized the occasions that prompted the “death-spiral” of each FTX and Alameda: 

Collapse of Alameda and FTX

Sept 28
Alameda acquired 174m FTT ($4.1b) from the FTT ICO Contract and despatched it to the FTX Deployer. This might every have been associated to the “FTX mortgage in Would probably / June” or FTX having to say FTT tokens by Alameda’s pockets as a result of inter-linked relationship between FTX and Alameda.

All withdrawals from the FTT company tokens vesting contract must bear this Alameda pockets as a result of it is declared the one beneficiary from the beginning (see Appendix). Nonetheless, them withdrawing the entire remaining tokens and sending them to FTX Deployer leaves a bitter sort in light of the mortgage settlement.

Oct 31- 1 Nov
An uncommon report of common stablecoin transfers from FTX Worldwide and FTX US to Alameda’s Circle, Binance and FTX pockets was seen. These stablecoins included USDC, BUSD, TUSD,PAX,TUSD and amounted to a whole of $388m USD.

Nov 2 
CoinDesk releases a report on Alameda’s stability sheet. It revealed that $5.8b of the $14.6b belongings on Alameda’s stability sheet have been reportedly in FTT and completely completely different Solana ecosystem tokens. The overwhelming majority of web fairness in Alameda’s enterprise was really FTX’s personal centrally-controlled token, FTT.

Nov 6 
Alameda CEO makes a press launch on the stability sheet report from Coindesk and clarifies that Alameda had >$10b of belongings that weren’t mirrored all through the piece. She doesn’t make clear liabilities that weren’t listed all through the report. The Tweet has since been deleted, and we weren’t capable of fully affirm her declare on-chain.

Binance CEO publicizes that they’ve determined to liquidate the remaining FTT on their books, price ~$584m in FTT. 
Alameda CEO provides to OTC purchase all of Binance’s FTT holdings for $22 per token, resulting in hypothesis that Alameda may need had loans which will have in another case been liquidated if the price of FTT falls beneath $22. This Tweet has since been deleted.

The evaluation of acknowledged Alameda wallets on the Ethereum chain steered that Alameda’s holdings on the Ethereum chain have been roughly valued at $21m on 6 Nov 2022 (based mostly on accessible Nansen knowledge) .

Scrutiny of the on-chain knowledge revealed that it was terribly unlikely that Alameda had the liquidity to buy Binance’s FTT when Caroline tweeted publicly on 2 Nov 2022. So then, what was the motivation behind Caroline’s public current to buy Binance’s FTTs?

Pockets balances obtained are based mostly on accessible Nansen knowledge. Exact pockets balances could also be bigger (e.g. doesn’t take into consideration LP tokens and/or Alameda’s balances on CEXs)

Binance CEO reinforces a press launch on liquidating their FTT holdings. There was no on-chain practice to assist this change on the time at which the assertion was made.FTX CEO responded by clarifying that FTX is solvent, stating that “FTX is okay, belongings are massive.” This Tweet has now been deleted.

Nov 7 
Markets resort to panic mode. Nansen’s monitoring of the 7-day stablecoin flows confirmed an web influx of $411.5m deposited into Binance, with an web outflow of $451.1m in withdrawals from FTX in that interval. 

Furthermore, our on-chain examination dropped at consideration an inventory of (unusually) large withdrawals earlier to FTX’s collapse. 
Entities who withdrew essential parts 24 hours ahead of withdrawals have been halted: 
The immense sell-pressure of FTT meant that the token lastly broke decrease than $22 per token.

Nov 8
FTX appeared to have paused withdrawals as reported by The Block. All by means of this era, FTX despatched 92m ($37m) of BIT to 🤓 Alameda Evaluation: 0x84d.
FTX CEO shared that Binance would enter correct proper right into a strategic transaction with FTX, of which Binance CEO introduced a non-binding Letter of Intent to fully purchase FTX and assist cowl its liquidity crunch. 

It appeared that Binance was leaning in course of scrapping FTX rescue takeover after taking first check out books. At this stage all through the timeline, FTX US had despatched $10m USDT to Alameda. Alameda Evaluation then despatched 130k FTT (~$715k) to 🏦 Binance: Alameda Deposit. Lastly, FTX US despatched 2,262 WBTC ($41m) to 🤓 Alameda Evaluation: WBTC which was later despatched to WBTC: Controller.

It is fascinating to notice that whereas FTX Worldwide had halted withdrawals, FTX US nonetheless managed to switch an enormous quantity of WBTC to Alameda. Alameda CEO furthermore implied that solely the FTX Worldwide entity was dealing with liquidity elements and that FTX US was unaffected.

 Nov 9
The Wall Avenue Journal reported that Binance had walked away from the FTX deal.

Nov 11
FTX filed for Chapter 11 chapter proceedings, with the FTX CEO resigning
In response to an unverified insider present that was leaked on Twitter as of 16 Nov, “Caroline painted Alameda and FTX getting liquidated as a attainable occasion moderately than a tail occasion.”

Moreover, FTX’s native token FTT was furthermore a highlight contributing to the fallout. The low float and caught purchase strain from FTX implied that the one concern which will doubtlessly set off the FTT price to go down was an enormous promote strain for the token.

Whereas the Coindesk report first garnered most of the individuals’s consideration to the connection between Alameda & FTX, the “bank-run” on FTX had furthermore coincided with the announcement that Binance was attempting to liquidate the remaining FTT on their books.

Piecing collectively the devices from our on-chain investigation, it was evident that the Luna/Terra collapse revealed a deep flaw between Alameda and FTX’s muddled relationship. There have been essential FTT outflows from Alameda to FTX all through the Terra-Luna/ 3AC state of affairs.

Primarily based mostly completely on the information, your complete $4b FTT outflows from Alameda to FTX in June and July may perhaps have been the availability of collateral that was used to safe the loans (price in any case $4b) in Would probably / June that was revealed by quite a bit of individuals near Bankman-Fried in a Reuters interview. 
We furthermore seen barely uncommon large common outflows of stablecoin tokens from FTX to Alameda’s wallets all by means of that point interval.

Given the cascading have an effect on of the Luna collapse, many firms like 3AC have been liquidated inflicting a contagion all by means of the crypto lending market. Whereas our on-chain investigation didn’t instantly affirm that particular person funds have been being siphoned from FTX to Alameda in makes an strive and “save” them from liquidation, the unusually large FTT inflows from FTX post-Luna/ 3AC trace at a believable case. 

From this stage on, the intermingled relationship between Alameda and FTX grew to become further troubling, provided that purchaser funds have been furthermore all through the equation.

Alameda was on the stage the place survival was its chosen precedence, and if one entity collapses, further hassle may begin brewing for FTX. Given how intertwined these entities have been set as lots as function, together with the over-leverage of collateral, our autopsy on-chain evaluation hints that the eventual collapse of Alameda (and the next have an effect on on FTX) was, probably, inevitable.

The sudden fallout of FTX had induced a rising concern all by means of the crypto market contributors – each patrons and retailers alike. If one factor, this case solely strengthens the necessity for added transparency in crypto. Our crew at Nansen Portfolio have compiled real-time dashboards that showcase crypto exchanges’ proof-of-reserves.

Whereas the report of asset holdings is non-exhaustive, that’s the 1st step to holding crypto contributors further accountable. Hyperlink to proof-of-reserves per entity by Nansen may be discovered right here.

All by means of our investigation we well-known a set of wallets which might or will not be going to be Alameda/ FTX’s addresses. Assertion of on-chain actions and interactions trace at a excessive chance that these wallets had an oblique publicity with Alameda. For lots of who’re all in favour of exploring these wallets, we now have supplied a quick description of the related actions.

To get a bigger understanding of our pockets labels, be taught further right here. 350m minted in whole and distributed in late July 2019 by Deployer, from there:

Judging by the quantity, these are virtually positively the FTX company and FTX company administrated tokens. The Alameda deal with being the one beneficiary of the vesting contract is an indication of a extraordinarily shut connection between the businesses. If the Alameda pockets receives FTT from the contract they attainable really belong to FTX. They normally ahead them ultimately and do nothing with them. 

5m as soon as extra to FTX Deployer which ended up on FTX deposits 0xa5d and 0x23b, may in all probability be Advisor tokens or a mixture of advisor and early patrons (attainable)

10m to Token Millionaire: 0x4aa (sits there until correct this second)
20m to FTX Deposit:0xa5d (comparable one the FTX Deployer deposited in, attainable affiliated with FTX and/or Alameda), tokens attainable distributed to FTT early patrons, distributed by means of the FTX platform

40m to token Millionaire: 0xef9, who furthermore acquired 9m from Alameda all through the identical time
27.5m to EIP1559 person: 0x209 who sends:

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